en

Scientific Journal of the National Academy of Internal Affairs

  • Received 06.02.2026,
  • Revised 04.05.2026,
  • Accepted 26.05.2026
  • Published 01.06.2026
Download article Download article
Vol. 31, No. 2, 2026
  • veto power; voting procedure; procedural accountability; global governance; regional representation
  • https://doi.org/10.63341/naia-herald/2.2026.70
  • Pages 70-84

This study examined the legal and political-institutional conditions for reforming the United Nations Security Council and assesses the significance of such reform for international law and global governance. The research was based on formal-legal, historical-legal, comparative, and problem-oriented legal methods. The study argue that Security Council reform has a distinctly political and legal character, since any modification of the Council’s composition, the status of its members, or its decision-making procedures must be consistent with the Charter of the United Nations. The veto power remains one of the main constraints on the Council’s effectiveness, as it enables a permanent member to prevent the adoption of a decision even when that decision is supported by a majority. The Charter amendment procedure also creates a high legal threshold for reform because it requires ratification by all permanent members of the Security Council. The 1963 enlargement of the Council demonstrated that institutional reform is legally possible, but it also illustrates the limits of reform that does not address the status of permanent members or the veto mechanism. The study showed that the positions of the Group of Four, comprising Brazil, Germany, India, and Japan, the African Union, United for Consensus, the United Kingdom, France, and China reflect different approaches to representation, regional balance, and the distribution of institutional privileges. The legal implications of reform depended not only on enlarging the Security Council, but also on reducing the blocking effect of the veto, strengthening transparency, and increasing the accountability of permanent members. For small states, particularly North Macedonia, reform was important as a means of enhancing the predictability of the international legal order and promoting a more equal application of international legal norms. The study concluded that Security Council reform should be approached as a gradual process aimed at broader representation, constraints on the use of the veto, greater accountability, and stronger global governance. Its practical significance lies in the possibility of using the findings to develop expert assessments and recommendations on Security Council reform, the reduction of the negative effects of the veto, and the improvement of the Council’s effectiveness

References

  1. African Union Executive Council. (2005). The common African position on the proposed reform of the United Nations: “The Ezulwini Consensus”. Retrieved from https://www.inthenet.eu/wp-content/uploads/2023/08/Ezulwini-Consensus.pdf.
  2. Alene, N.M., Ali, M.S., & Tadesse, K.Y. (2023). Africa’s quest for reform of the United Nations Security Council: A just cause curbed by unrealistic proposals. African Journal on Conflict Resolution, 23(1), 60-83.
  3. Amevor, S.J.-J., Amenorhu, F.Y., & Kipo-Sunyehzi, D.D. (2025). Reforms of the United Nations’ Security Council to ensure equity and efficiency: An argument for selected emerging countries’ inclusion. International Journal for Multidisciplinary Research, 7(4). doi: 10.36948/ijfmr.2025.v07i04.52912.
  4. Arcari, M. (2022). The conflict in Ukraine and the hurdles of collective action. Questions of International Law, 96, 7-25.
  5. Archibugi, D., Cellini, M., & Malgieri, A. (2025). The reform of the UN Security Council: What are the issues? Global Governance: A Review of Multilateralism and International Organizations, 31(2), 137-162. doi: 10.1163/19426720-03102003.
  6. Arrocha Olabuenaga, P. (2023). G.A. Res. 76/262 on a standing mandate for a General Assembly debate when a veto is cast in the Security Council (U.N.). International Legal Materials, 62(2), 284-288. doi: 10.1017/ilm.2022.46.
  7. Binder, M., & Heupel, M. (2021). The intricacies of UN Security Council reform. Survival, 63(2), 63-68. doi: 10.1080/00396338.2021.1905984.
  8. Cai, C., van den Herik, L., & Maluwa, T. (2024). The UN Security Council and the maintenance of peace in a changing world. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. doi: 10.1017/9781009423458.
  9. Chesterman, S. (2025). Untied Nations? Saving the UN Security Council. European Journal of International Law, 36(4), 1089-1104. doi: 10.1093/ejil/chaf071.
  10. Council of the European Union. (2026). Qualified majority. Retrieved from https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/council-eu/how-does-the-council-vote/qualified-majority/.
  11. Delegation of the European Union to the United Nations in New York. (2025). EU statement – UN Security Council open debate: Practicing multilateralism, reforming and improving global governance. Retrieved from https://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/un-new-york/eu-statement-un-security-council-open-debate-practicing-multilateralism-reforming-and-improving_en?s=63&.
  12. Dharmadhikari, J. (2025). France supports Security Council reform. Retrieved from https://onu.delegfrance.org/france-supports-security-council-reform.
  13. Di Gianfrancesco, L. (2025). Questioning the use of the veto: The Veto Initiative and the General Assembly’s role as an accountability forum for the Security Council. International Community Law Review, 27(3), 191-217. doi: 10.1163/18719732-bja10144.
  14. Gifkins, J. (2021). Beyond the veto: Roles in UN security council decision-making. Global Governance, 27(1), 1-24. doi: 10.1163/19426720-02701003.
  15. Government of Canada. (2024). Uniting for Consensus: Joint statement. Retrieved from https://www.international.gc.ca/world-monde/international_relations-relations_internationales/un-onu/statements-declarations/2024-09-26-statement-declaration.aspx?lang=eng.
  16. Gowan, R. (2026). The UN Security Council: Still room for compromise? International Affairs, 102(1), 249-259. doi: 10.1093/ia/iiaf234.
  17. Hathaway, O.A., Mills, M.M., & Zimmerman, H. (2025). Crisis and change at the United Nations: Non-amendment reform and institutional evolution. Michigan Journal of International Law, 46(1), 1-68. doi: 10.36642/mjil.46.1.crisis.
  18. Johnstone, I. (2024). Restoring the legitimacy of the Security Council. In M.A. Khalil & F. Lavaud (Eds.), Empowering the UN Security Council: Reforms to address modern threats (pp. 73-90). Oxford: Oxford University Press. doi: 10.1093/oso/9780197780602.003.0006.
  19. Kato, A. (2025). Revitalizing the obligatory abstention rule in the UN Security Council: An interpretation of the proviso in Article 27(3) of the UN Charter. Journal of Conflict and Security Law, 30(1), 3-22. doi: 10.1093/jcsl/kraf002.
  20. Khalil, M.A., & Lavaud, F. (2024). Empowering the UN Security Council: Reforms to address modern threats. Oxford: Oxford University Press. doi: 10.1093/oso/9780197780602.001.0001.
  21. Leka, G. (2025). Identity and ambition: North Macedonia’s status seeking through its foreign policy (2006-2017). Academicus International Scientific Journal, 16(32), 36-55.
  22. Leka, G., Shehu, S., & Ibraimi, E. (2025). Analyzing North Macedonia’s size and power in the context of its foreign policy conduct. Academicus International Scientific Journal, 16(31), 121-140. doi: 10.7336/academicus.2025.31.08.
  23. Lepard, B.D. (2021). Challenges in implementing the responsibility to protect: The Security Council veto and the need for a common ethical approach. The Journal of Ethics, 25, 223-246. doi: 10.1007/s10892-021-09360-8.
  24. Maluwa, T. (2023). The Ukraine War and the paralysis of the Security Council: Ramifications for Africa’s common position on Security Council reform. Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law, 27(1), 621-658. doi: 10.1163/18757413_02701022.
  25. Mbara, G.C. (2021). Re-evaluating the African Union’s Ezulwini Consensus in the reform of the United Nations’ Security Council. Journal of African Union Studies, 10(1), 53-70. doi: 10.31920/2050-4306/2021/10n1a3.
  26. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China. (2025). Remarks by China’s Permanent Representative to the UN Ambassador Fu Cong on the reform of the Security Council at the 80th session of the UN General Assembly plenary meeting. Retrieved from https://www.mfa.gov.cn/eng/xw/zwbd/202511/t20251125_11759619.html.
  27. Okada, Y. (2023). Locating the veto power in the international legal order: When a permanent member of the UN Security Council becomes an aggressor. In S. Furuya, H. Takemura & K. Ozaki (Eds.), Global impact of the Ukraine conflict (pp. 71-91). Cham: Springer. doi: 10.1007/978-981-99-4374-6_4.
  28. Parvanova, E. (2023). Reforming the United Nations Security Council: Cross-country analysis of a G-4 potential permanent membership. Journal of the Bulgarian Geographical Society, 49, 69-77. doi: 10.3897/jbgs.e109546.
  29. Pay, V.N., & Postolski, P. (2022). Power and diplomacy in the United Nations Security Council: The influence of elected members. The International Spectator, 57(2), 1-17. doi: 10.1080/03932729.2021.1966192.
  30. Permanent Mission of Japan to the United Nations. (2026). Joint G4 statement by Brazil, Germany, India, and Japan, delivered by H.E. Ambassador YAMAZAKI Kazuyuki, Permanent Representative of Japan to the United Nations, at the informal meeting of the General Assembly on the intergovernmental negotiations on Security Council reform. Retrieved from https://www.un.emb-japan.go.jp/itpr_en/jointstatement022026.html.
  31. Peters, A. (2023). The war in Ukraine and legal limitations on Russian vetoes. Journal on the Use of Force and International Law, 10(2), 162-172. doi: 10.1080/20531702.2023.2264085.
  32. Pirozzi, N. (2023). Grasping the nettle of UN Security Council reform: The Uniting for Consensus proposal. Retrieved from https://www.iai.it/en/publications/c09/grasping-nettle-un-security-council-reform.
  33. Rensmann, T. (2024). Reform. In B. Simma, D.-E. Khan, G. Nolte & A. Paulus (Eds.), The charter of the United Nations: A commentary (pp. 41-106). Oxford: Oxford University Press. doi: 10.1093/law/9780192864536.003.0002.
  34. Risteski, T. (2026). Republic of North Macedonia: Three decades of benefits from the European political and security architecture. Knowledge – International Journal, 75(6), 665-670.
  35. Security Council Report. (2026). Living with the veto. Retrieved from https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/Veto_report_2026_F.pdf.
  36. Sellström, A.M. (2023). At the watchtower: Africa and the UN Security Council’s elected ten (E10). International Peacekeeping, 30(3), 275-282. doi: 10.1080/13533312.2023.2237809.
  37. Serdiuk, V. (2024). UN General Assembly Resolution 76/262 as a strengthening of the collective response to the use of the veto right in the UN Security Council. Problems of Legality, 164, 246-265. doi: 10.21564/2414-990X.164.292237.
  38. Siljanovska-Davkova, G. (2025). Republic of North Macedonia. General Debate of the 80th Session of the United Nations General Assembly. Retrieved from https://gadebate.un.org/en/80/republic-north-macedonia.
  39. Staunton, E. (2025). Emerging norms and international change: The responsibility not to veto and its impact on the Security Council. Review of International Studies. doi: 10.1017/S0260210525101447.
  40. Tomuschat, C. (2008). Uniting for peace: General Assembly Resolution 377 (V). Retrieved from https://legal.un.org/avl/ha/ufp/ufp.html.
  41. Trahan, J. (2023). Legal issues surrounding veto use and aggression. Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law, 55(1), 93-146.
  42. United Nations General Assembly. (1963). Question of equitable representation on the Security Council and the Economic and Social Council. Retrieved from https://docs.un.org/en/A/RES/1991%28XVIII%29.
  43. United Nations General Assembly. (1993). Question of equitable representation on and increase in the membership of the Security Council. Retrieved from https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/WMP%20A%20RES%2048%2026.pdf.
  44. United Nations General Assembly. (1998). Question of equitable representation on and increase in the membership of the Security Council and related matters. Retrieved from https://docs.un.org/en/A/RES/53/30.
  45. United Nations General Assembly. (2005). 2005 World Summit Outcome: Resolution adopted by the General Assembly. Retrieved from https://docs.un.org/en/a/res/60/1.
  46. United Nations General Assembly. (2008). Question of equitable representation on and increase in the membership of the Security Council and related matters. Retrieved from https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/Decision%2062_557.pdf.
  47. United Nations General Assembly. (2022). Standing mandate for a General Assembly debate when a veto is cast in the Security Council. Retrieved from https://docs.un.org/en/a/res/76/262.
  48. United Nations General Assembly. (2025). Revised Co-Chairs’ elements paper on convergences and divergences on the question of equitable representation on and increase in the membership of the Security Council and related matters. Retrieved from https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/4086911/files/Revised-Co-Chairs-Elements-Paper-2025.pdf.
  49. United Nations General Assembly. (2026). Security Council reform: 79th session of the General Assembly. Retrieved from https://www.un.org/en/ga/screform/79/index.shtml.
  50. United Nations Security Council. (n.d.a). Vetoes since 1946. Retrieved from https://main.un.org/securitycouncil/en/content/vetoes-since-1946.
  51. United Nations Security Council. (n.d.b). Provisional rules of procedure (S/96/Rev.7). Retrieved from https://main.un.org/securitycouncil/en/content/provisional-rules-procedure.
  52. Upadhyay, A., & Mehrotra, A. (2025). Assessing the efficacy of the responsibility to protect (R2P) principle amidst the misuse of veto power: A critical analysis. International Journal of Legal Information, 53(1), 64-71. doi: 10.1017/jli.2025.10053.
  53. Winther, B.Z. (2022). What is the problem represented to be in the Group of Four’s policy on reform of the United Nations Security Council? An argument for clarity towards the Global South. Bandung: Journal of the Global South, 9(3), 444-470. doi: 10.1163/21983534-09030004.
  54. Young, A. (2024). The UK remains a strong supporter of UN Security Council reform: UK statement in the UN General Assembly. Retrieved from https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/the-uk-remains-a-strong-supporter-of-un-security-council-reform-uk-statement-in-the-un-general-assembly.